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IN THE UTAH,' COURT1 OF APPEALS 
THE STATE : I ll 11T2 H, : 
Plaintif £/Appe1lee, 
v. : 
i J 1 N I!Ob!Li!L"INI Mulvl ' l ' "" ' • V A , : C a s e No . 9602, J 7-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appe11ant Gino Montoya regies on his opening 
brief and replies a~- follow-- Matters not; discussed in this 
,.ei. • Ti r-" • •"-" --r --.-v-- •-:* ^  I w |i - i • *r -finning 
b r i e i o r d o not iiieri t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . 
SUMMARY OE THE ARGUMEM "T" 
The issue presented i n this case i s not whether Montoya 
shoul d have been incarcerated ox given probation .nstead, the 
.imposing consecutive sentences, Tnis issue requires 
consideration of different factors than the probation-
demonstrate tt •' \.n- ria: rear*, ab^sec it? aiscre: :c i 
imposing consecutiv*= sentences. 
"Ti l i s • : i. . -----
year firearm enhancements rie State agrees tha: ^-icn a remand 
is required in this case. Addition?1.1.1- - ne Utah .°uDreme Court 
issued a decision after Appe^iat: :. . ;_s briei ,v:A::n mandates 
such a remand. See State v. Higcrinbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 
(Utah 1996) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
The trial judge acknowledged at sentencing that the 
sentence she imposed was "more lengthy than many homicides." 
R. 32 9. Gino's sentence, as it now stands, exceeds the sentence 
imposed in many homicides as well as other crimes where 
individuals are seriously injured. While punishment is certainly 
appropriate, the issue in this case is whether the imposition of 
consecutive sentences was excessive and an abuse of discretion 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2), not whether Gino should have 
been given probation rather than incarceration. 
In its brief, the State appears to confuse the question 
of incarceration versus probation with the consecutive sentencing 
issue presented in this case. For instance, the State argues 
that Montoya's "severe learning and cognitive deficits" "might be 
relevant if he had identified a particular program that could 
address his mental impairments better than prison, but he has not 
done so." State's brief at 21. Obviously, "identifying a 
particular program that could address [Montoya's] mental 
impairments better than prison" would relate to the question of 
whether Montoya should have been placed on probation. Montoya is 
not arguing that he should have been placed on probation; the 
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claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in 
imposing consecutive sentences. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2), the trial court 
must consider a defendant's rehabilitative needs in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. Montoya has special 
rehabilitative needs which have not been recognized or met in the 
past. The fact that he has positive personality traits which 
suggest that he is amenable to treatment if such treatment takes 
into account his deficits weighs in favor of concurrent 
sentences. 
Individuals with learning and cognitive deficits present 
"quite challenging" and "difficult" treatment or educational 
situations. This does not mean they are hopeless and should not 
be given the opportunity for treatment or education. Nor does it 
mean that they should be given consecutive sentences. In Gino's 
case, his special needs demonstrate an explanation for some of 
his past behavior and a reason for sentencing him concurrently. 
Mental health professionals have not "gotten close" to 
Gino, as suggested by the State. State's brief at 23. The State 
selects out of context some of the words included in the 
presentence report. R. 26a. The presentence investigator was 
actually referring to a March 1991 psychological evaluation done 
under court order. R. 26a. Such an evaluation hardly presents a 
situation where Gino and a mental health professional have 
"gotten close." Further, the investigator's hearsay depiction of 
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that evaluation1 is not nearly as negative as the State paints 
it. 
The presentence report's depiction of the Long evaluation 
from which the State lifted the negative words listed on page 23 
of its brief actually points out that 
the defendant's upbringing and home environment 
were noted as being the most significant factors 
to account for his criminal behavior. The 
defendant grew up in an anti-social environment 
and is very aggressive as a result. Dr. Long 
found the defendant to be functioning within a 
dull to normal range of intellectual ability with 
an IQ score of 81. Difficulty in thinking and 
concentrating were noted coupled with 
resentfulness, hostility, and aggressiveness. 
In his personality description, Dr. Long 
states "he is unable to express his feelings in a 
modulated fashion; feelings are either bottled up 
or expressed by acting out. His judgement is 
impaired and he fails to profit from experience." 
The problems are compounded by the defendant's 
abusive use of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, 
according to Dr. Long. "He is anxious and 
pessimistic, apathetic and emotionally inhibited 
and controlled. He becomes maladaptive under 
stress and becomes confused and disorganized. He 
is easily excited and often becomes emotional. 
He is argumentative, sarcastic, self-indulgent, 
shrewd, and deceitful; he has a plethora of 
problems." The diagnostic impression provided in 
1991 was Axis I: Borderline intellectual 
functioning, alcohol, cannabis, cocaine abuse; 
and Axis II: Anti-social personality disorder. 
As recommended by Dr. Long many of the 
defendant's problems could be lessened if not 
eliminated were he able to withdraw himself from 
his gang lifestyle and put forth a modicum of 
effort. Unfortunately, the defendant has proven 
unwilling to make any such long term effort to 
date. 
i The presentence investigator may well have taken the same 
approach as the State did in its brief, and selected bits and 
pieces of Dr. Long's report out of context, thereby changing the 
impact of such report. 
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R. 26a (emphasis added). 
The State lists all of the charges ever filed against 
Montoya, regardless of outcome. State's brief at 9-10. 
Presumably, the State's point is that Montoya's record supports 
the consecutive sentences. Many of the charges, however, were 
dismissed for a variety of reasons. Basing a consecutive 
sentence on charges dismissed in another case is not an 
acceptable or reliable method for sentencing a defendant. See 
State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993) (sentence must be 
based on reliable information). 
Additionally, the State seems to suggest that because 
Montoya entered into a plea bargain, the consecutive sentences 
were appropriate. State's brief at 16, 19. The State argues 
that Montoya was charged with twelve first degree minimum 
mandatories and that such charges coupled with the firearm 
enhancements would result "in possible consecutive sentences of 
between 72 and 192 years without possibility of parole." State's 
brief at 19. The State's point, apparently, is that since 
Montoya bargained away the minimum mandatory sentences, 
consecutive sentences were permissible to make up for the State's 
loss in the bargain. The charges, however, and their potential 
aggregate sentence is irrelevant to the statutorily outlined 
considerations for imposing consecutive sentences. 
Plea bargains are entered into for a variety of reasons 
which are not always apparent from the record on appeal. Looking 
to the original charges to determine whether to uphold 
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consecutive sentences is inappropriate where those charges have 
been bargained away. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that if Montoya 
had pled guilty to or been convicted of the twelve minimum 
mandatory charges and been sentenced consecutively to "between 72 
and 192 years without possibility of parole," such sentences 
would not have held up under State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1993), and State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995). 
As pointed out by Appellant in his opening brief at 31, 
if Strunk and Smith are limited to consecutive sentences imposed 
on minimum mandatory charges, an inequity in the imposition of 
consecutive sentences will exist. In some cases, defendants 
would be better off pleading to minimum mandatory charges in 
order to avoid the potential of consecutive sentences. For 
example, in Gino's case, had he pled guilty to six minimum 
mandatory charges rather than the six lesser counts to which he 
pled, Montoya could not have been sentenced consecutively 
pursuant to Strunk and Smith. 
Finally, it is important to note that all of the charges 
in this case arose from the use of a single gun during an 
impulsive episode. Gino was confused and scared and carried away 
by that fear and confusion. As Gino told the presentence 
investigator: "My mom had told me that the gang unit officers 
had been to her home about six times looking for me and that they 
would kill me if I ran. So, I was scared. I felt that I was 
wanted and that they would shoot me." R. 6a. When Gino stopped 
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to reflect on what had occurred, he gave himself up. 
Based on the use of that single gun during an ongoing, 
impulsive, unplanned act, the State filed an Amended Information 
containing sixteen counts. Most of those counts relied on the 
use of that single gun to reach an "aggravated" status or to 
define the elements of the crime. Additionally, the firearm 
enhancements all relied on the single use of that gun. Montoya 
pled guilty to six counts. Two of those counts in addition to 
the three firearm enhancements relied on that single use of the 
gun. The charges to which Montoya pled guilty along with the 
firearm enhancements already had taken into account the gravity 
of this crime, and had already been enhanced or aggravated based 
on the use of the gun. 
The issue of consecutive versus concurrent sentences is 
important to individuals such as Gino Montoya who are facing the 
possibility of lengthy incarceration. Consecutive sentences can 
be in essence sentences of life without possibility of parole. 
Such sentences can take away incentive to advance in levels at 
the prison, obtain further education, participate in programs, 
work towards parole, or otherwise assume a positive attitude. In 
this case where the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences, the case should be remanded for 
resentencing. 
POINT II. THIS CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR 
CORRECTION OF THE THREE-YEAR FIREARM 
ENHANCEMENTS. 
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The State concedes in its brief that the trial judge 
improperly imposed three firearm enhancements of three years 
each. State's brief at 27-28. The State agrees that this case 
must be remanded for correction of firearm enhancements. State's 
brief at 28. 
Additionally, after Appellant filed his brief in this 
case, the Utah Supreme Court issued a decision which directly 
controls this issue. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551.2 In 
Higginbotham, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court 
erred in imposing two consecutive two-year firearm enhancements. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551. The Court reasoned that Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(1) "does not authorize a consecutive, 
determinable two year term . . . ." Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 
551. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded Higginbotham for 
"correction of the illegal two-year sentence enhancement." Id. 
As set forth in both Appellant's and Appellee's briefs, 
and as required by the recent Utah Supreme Court decision in 
Higginbotham, this case must be remanded for correction of the 
illegal sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Montoya respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the consecutive sentence and 
The State did not cite Higginbotham in its brief. 
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weapon enhancement order and remand the case for resentencing. 
SUBMITTED this I3LJJL day of September, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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